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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR THE YEAR 1952
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
The increasing reluctance of courts to interfere with admin-
istrative decisions, irrespective of provisions of statutes calling
for judicial review, is evidenced by recent decisions of the
highest courts of Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and New Mexico.
Oklahoma. In Oklahoma, on judicial review of decisions of the
Corporation Commission, the supreme court, by statute, exercises
independent judgment on the law and the facts whenever a con-
stitutional right is claimed to have been violated. In all other
cases the review is to determine merely whether the Commission
regularly pursued its authority and whether its findings and con-
clusions are sustained by the law and substantial evidence.' In
Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Commission2 a pro-
ration order of the Commission restricted gas production from a
160-acre tract on the finding that only 57 acres of the tract were
productive. Complainant appealed on the ground that the entire
160 acres were in fact productive and that the order as entered
thus deprived it of property without due process of law. In sus-
taining the order the court acknowledged that, since confisca-
tion of property was involved, the court was "authorized to exer-
cise its own independent judgment as to the law and the facts."'
Nevertheless, after noting that proration was within the police
power of the state, the court held that no constitutional right was
violated since the order was "supported by competent and sub-
stantial evidence."' It thus appears that, in spite of the express
language of the statute calling for exercise of independent judg-
1 OKLA. CONST. Art. 9, § 20.
2205 OkIa. 672, 241 P. 2d 363 (1951), app. dism., 342 U.S. 938 (1952).
8 241 P. 2d at 368.
4 241 P. 2d at 372.
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ment where constitutional issues are asserted, the court applied
the substantial evidence rule.
Texas. Similar liberality has marked recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Texas in construing statutes governing judicial
review of administrative decisions. In Board of Water Engineers
v. Colorado River Municipal Water District5 the court had before
it the statute governing review of orders of the Board of Water
Engineers, which provides in part as follows:
In all such trials the burden of proof shall be upon the party com-
plaining of such law, rules, regulations or orders or act of the Board
and such law, rules, regulations or orders or act of the Board so com-
plained of shall be deemed prima facie valid but the trial shall be de
novo, and the court shall determine independently all issues of fact
and of law with respect to the validity and reasonableness of the law,
rules, regulations or orders or acts of the Board complained of.6
The court, speaking through Chief Justice Hickman, held that,
notwithstanding the de novo provision in the statute, on judicial
review the court was limited to the determination of whether the
order was reasonably supported by substantial evidence.7 This
case is in line with previous decisions of the court construing de
novo statutes as calling for review by the substantial evidence
rule.'
Arkansas. In Arkansas a statute governing review of certain
orders of the Public Service Commission provides that the su-
preme court shall not be bound by any finding of fact of the
5 ------ Tex .-., 254 S.W. 2d 369 (1953).
6 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1950 Supp.) art. 7880-3c, § F.
7 Judge Smedley dissented and stated his position in part as follows:
" 'De novo' alone strongly suggests that there shall be a trial anew, and when
it is coupled with other words to the effect that the court shall determine all
issues of fact and of law independently, a construction that such language means
and intends that there shall be a limited trial under the substantial evidence
rule is a constrained construction and is in my opinion unreasonable.... [T]he
plain meaning of the statute is that the district court shall try the case de novo
in the full sense of the term and 'determine independently all issues of fact'."
254 S.W. 2d at 375, 376.
8 Harris, A Reappraisal o! the Substantial Evidence Rule in Texas Administrative
Law, 3 Southw. L. J. 416, 427, 431 (1949).
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circuit court but shall review all the evidence and make such
findings of fact and law as it may deem just, proper and equi-
table.' This statute has been construed as requiring a review de
novo.1° In Chamber of Commerce of City of Hot Springs v. Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry." the court limited the de novo re-
quirement to method of trial rather than to scope of decision. The
court said:
It is our duty to try the cause de novo but not to reverse the Commis-
sion unless its findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence. 12
This rule was applied although in Arkansas judicial review of
administrative decisions is limited to the administrative record
and is not based upon a new record adduced before the court."
New Mexico. The courts in New Mexico are limited by statute
to determining whether orders of the Corporation Commission are
lawful and reasonable; if so, the court must affirm; if not, the
court must reverse.' 4 In a recent case 5 an attempt of a circuit
court to amend an order of the Commission met with reversal in
the supreme court on the ground that substitution of the judg-
' ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. §§ 73-133, 73-134. In Arkansas there is a second statute
pertaining to methods of review of orders of the Public Service Commission. Section 73-
233 limits the scope of review to determining whether the Commission acted within its
authority or whether its action affected constitutional rights. This last statute was
passed in 1935 along with the creation of the Department of Public Utilities. The
former statute was enacted in 1921 and applied to review of orders of the Railroad
Commission, which later became the Corporation Commission. In 1945 the Corpora.
tion Commission and the Department of Public Utilities were combined into the Public
Service Commission, but the two methods of review were left the same.
10 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Williams, 201 Ark. 895, 148 S.W. 2d 644 (1941).
11 ---Ark.., 249 S.W. 2d 8 (1952).
12 249 S.W. 2d at 9.
13 Motor Truck Transfer, Inc. v. Southwestern Transp. Co., 197 Ark. 346, 122 S.W.
2d 471 (1938). The rule thus differs from that of Texas where de novo review has been
construed as requiring a retrial of the facts in court. The Texas type of review is criti-
cized in Comment, 2 Ark. L. Rev. 67, 73 (1947-48). It is said there, "There is no
good reason why review upon the administrative record may not be made as effective
as a review based upon a de novo hearing. It is a lawyer's business to preserve an
adequate record and he can be as diligent in doing so before a Commission as before
a court." The soundness of this argument, however, depends on whether or not a
lawyer is retained.
14 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 68-1363.
15 Transcontinental Bus Lines v. State Corp. Com., 56 N. M. 158, 241 P. 2d 829
(1952).
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ment of the court for the order of the Commission would consti-
tute an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the ju-
diciary. This result was reached in face of a statutory provision
that every action to vacate or amend an order of the Commission
must be filed in 90 days.16 The court construed the statute as per-
taining to the time limits for appeal and as having no effect upon
judicial power.17
NECESSITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
Oklahoma. In Oklahoma the rule generally has been followed
that orders of the State Industrial Commission must be supported
by findings of fact," and that where such findings are "too un-
certain for judicial interpretation, an order based thereon will
be vacated for further proceedings."19 The rule recently was
applied in De Vore v. Maidt Plastering Co.,2" where the finding
of a trial commissioner that the evidence was insufficient to show
that the claimant sustained an accidental personal injury arising
out of and in the course of his employment was held to be "too
indefinite and uncertain for judicial interpretation and to form
the basis of an order denying compensation."2 1 The rule is an
excellent one wherever judicial review is based upon an adminis-
trative record.22 Under the prevailing Texas doctrine, in which
16 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 68-1364.
17 After determining that § 68-1363 only allows the courts to set aside or vacate an
order on the ground that it is unlawful or unreasonable, the court held that the order
of the Commission should have been set aside by the circuit court because of evident
procedural errors by the Commission. The court determined that the Commission had
not considered existing transportation facilities for which a certificate was sought (as
required by §68-1308) and that the Commission had taken notice of outside evidence
without entering it in the record.
78 McCarthy v. Forbes Painting & Decorating Co., 200 Okla. 555, 198 P. 2d 212
(1948) ; Adams v. City of Anadarko, 198 Okla. 484, 180 P. 2d 159 (1947) ; Corzine v.
Traders Compress, 196 Okla. 259, 164 P. 2d 625 (1945).
19 Fischback & Moore, Inc. v. State Industrial Commission, 201 Okla. 170, 203 P.
2d 422, 425 (1949).
20 205 Okla. 612, 239 P. 2d 520 (1951).
21 239 P. 2d at 521.
22 Wichita Railroad & Light Company v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas,
260 U. S. 48 (1922).
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evidence is received anew by the reviewing court," there is less
need for the rule. Generally, in Texas failure of an agency to make
findings of fact will not be fatal to the order unless findings are
expressly required by statute.2
VALUATION OF UTILITY PROPERTIES FOR RATE BASE PURPOSES
Arkansas. The Supreme Court of Arkansas recently approved
original or book cost less depreciation reserve as a formula of
valuation of public utility properties for rate purposes. 25 Although
the many other tests which have been used for these purposes
were considered by the court, 26 it was held that under the circum-
stances27 the cost less depreciation formula was not unreasonable
and did not result in confiscation of the utility's properties. The
decision is an important one in the constant conflict between
utilities and rate commissioners as to the proper method of
appraising the value of properties for rate purposes. The court
noted that whether original cost or cost of reproduction is more
favorable to the utility will depend largely on whether the
economic conditions prevailing at the time are inflationary or
deflationary.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Arkansas. By statute2 1 in Arkansas the Oil and Gas Commission
has broad discretionary powers to prevent pollution of fresh
23 Larson, The Substantial Evidence Rule: Texas Version, 5 Southw. L. J. 152, 153
(1951).
24 Note, 6 Southw. L. J. 284 (1952); TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art.
911 b, § 5a (d). In Texas the Railroad Commission is required by statute to make
specific findings of fact, for failure of which orders become void (but not absolutely
void so as to be subject to a collateral attack), whereas in Oklahoma only the court
requires specific findings of fact be set forth, for failure of which the order will be
vacated.
25 City of Ft. Smith v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., .... Ark ---, 247 S.W.
2d 474 (1952).
26The tests mentioned were (a) original cost, (b) the cost of reproduction, (c)
outstanding capitalization, (d) present value, (e) prudent investments and (f) net
earnings. Id. at 482.
27 The cost was determined by the Commission as of December 31, 1950; the court
modified this part, ordering that the Commission determine the cost as of September
.30, 1950. Id. at 481.
28 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 53-101 et seq.
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waters. In Spartan Drilling Co. v. Bull29 a group of home owners
brought an action in equity to prevent Spartan Drilling Company
from polluting their streams and creating a nuisance. Spartan
contended that since primary jurisdiction was vested in the Com-
mission by statute, the equity court was without jurisdiction to
hear the complaint. The court held that nothing in the statute
revealed that the legislature intended jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion to be exclusive or that courts of equity should be deprived
of their inherent powers to abate nuisances, and that it was
immaterial whether the Commission had attempted to regulate
the water in controversy.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was developed principally
in rate cases where uniformity of action is of particular import-
ance."0 The factual situation in the instant case is non-recurrent
and does not require constant regulation. There is clearly less
need for application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Not
considered by the court was the interesting question whether the
enjoining of pollution is a proceeding so inherently judicial in
nature as to be beyond the power of the legislature to delegate
to an administrative agency.3 '
Jack Redden.
29 ------ Ark_-_ 252 S.W. 2d 408 (1952).
80 In Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907), in
spite of a statute clearly allowing a complainant to institute a suit on his own behalf,
the Supreme Court required that a person seeking redress from unreasonable rates first
complain to the Interstate Commerce Commission, "which body alone is vested with
power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established [rate]
schedule." Further distinction between the two situations may be that the determination
of whether water has been polluted is far less complex than the determination of whether
rates are reasonable or are so low as to be confiscatory.
31 See discussion in Harris, The Administrative Law of Texas, 29 Tex. L. Rev. 213,
217 (1950).
